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If the initial quantum state of the universe is a multiverse superposition over many different sets of
values of the effective coupling ‘constants’ of physics, and if this quantum state collapses to an eigenstate
of the set of coupling ‘constants’ with a probability purely proportional to the absolute square of the
amplitude (with no additional factor for something like life or consciousness), then one should not expect
that the coupling ‘constants’ would be so biophilic as they are observed to be. Therefore, the observed
biophilic values (apparent ﬁne tuning) of the coupling ‘constants’ is statistical evidence against such
simple forms of wavefunction collapse.
© 2013 Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Two alternative types of quantum theory are Copenhagen-type
versions in which the wavefunction is said to collapse at measure-
ments, and Everett-type versions in which the wavefunction never
collapses. Often it is believed that these two types are merely
matters of interpretation that have no observational consequences.
I have previously demonstrated that this is not necessarily so
[1–3]. Now I further show that the biophilic ﬁne-tuning observed
for the ‘constants’ of nature in our part of the universe is statis-
tical evidence against certain simple collapse versions of quantum
theory in an initial quantum state that is a multiverse superposi-
tion over many different sets of the effective coupling ‘constants’
of physics.
Consider multiverse theories (such as what one might ex-
pect from a string/M theory landscape [4–6]) in which the quan-
tum state gives a superposition of different possible ‘constants’ of
physics. In Everett versions all components of the quantum state
would have real existence, and the normalized measure (‘probabil-
ity’) for an observation would be given by the quantum amplitudes
and some as-yet-undetermined rule for getting the measure from
the quantum state (perhaps as a normalized expectation value of
a positive operator, though I have shown it cannot be a projection
operator as one might have expected from the simplest interpre-
tation of Born’s rule [7–11]). For a suitable rule, one would expect
that the measure would be weighted toward components of the
quantum state in which there are more observers, or a higher
density of observers, favoring components in which the ‘constants’
have biophilic values, which is indeed what we observe.
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would expect the probability of any result from the collapse of the
wavefunction to depend purely on the absolute square of the am-
plitude. There is no reason to expect this to favor biophilic values
of the ‘constants.’ Of course, if the collapse occurred to a com-
ponent of the wavefunction with absolutely no observations, this
result would not be observed. Therefore, to get normalized prob-
abilities for observations, we must condition on the occurrence of
at least one observation. However, since a component of the wave-
function in which the universe is suﬃciently large may have some
observations even if the ‘constants’ are not particularly biophilic,
one would not expect even this selection to restrict to components
of the wavefunction in which the ‘constants’ have highly biophilic
values, just biophilic enough to permit at least one observation.
One would then expect that most of the conditional probabilities
for observations (conditional on there being an observation) in col-
lapse versions of quantum theory to give values of the ‘constants’
that are much less biophilic than what we observe.
Therefore, the highly biophilic values that we observe for the
‘constants’ of physics give statistical evidence against the collapse
of the wavefunction.
2. Consequences for toy models of multiverse states
Let us examine the difference between collapse and no-collapse
versions of quantum theory with some simple toy models. By a
collapse (or Copenhagen) version, I essentially mean what might
more accurately be called a single-history version, in which quan-
tum theory gives probabilities for various alternative sequences of
events, but only one sequence actually occurs. Each such alterna-
tive sequence might be called a “history” or a “world.” In contrast,
by a no-collapse (or Everett) version, I mean a ‘many-worlds’ ver-
sion, in which all the possible histories or worlds with nonzero
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ties being not propensities for potential histories to be actualized
(since all with nonzero quantum amplitude are actual), but instead
essentially measures for the magnitudes of the existence of the
various histories.
For Model I, for simplicity let there be only two alternative
worlds or sequences of events, with not-so-biophilic World 1 hav-
ing quantum measure p1 = 1–10−30 and N1 = 1010 observations,
and with highly biophilic World 2 having quantum measure p2 =
10−30 and N2 = 1090 observations. Assume that the number of ob-
servations in each world is determined by the values of effective
coupling ‘constants’ of physics that are observed in the respective
observations, so that the observations themselves show whether
the world is not so biophilic or highly biophilic. The question then
arises as to which type of observation is more probable.
In collapse versions of quantum theory in which the probability
of the collapse of the wavefunction to each world is the quantum
measure, almost certainly (probability 1–10−30) the reduction of
the quantum state would give the not-so-biophilic World 1 and
its observed effective coupling ‘constants.’ On the other hand, in
no-collapse versions in which the total measure for all observa-
tions is proportional to the number of observations as well as to
the quantum measure for the corresponding world, most of the to-
tal measure for observations would occur for the highly biophilic
World 2 and its observed effective coupling ‘constants.’ That is,
these simple collapse versions would predict most probably the
not-so-biophilic parameter values, whereas the no-collapse version
would predict most probably the more biophilic parameter values.
The collapse or single-history version of quantum theory is
like assigning lottery tickets to World 1 and World 2 in the ra-
tio p1 : p2. Then it is as if a lottery ticket were chosen at random
to select which world, and its observations, exist.
The no-collapse or many-worlds version of quantum theory is
like assigning lottery tickets to each observation in World 1 and 2
with ratio p1 : p2, so that the ratio of the total number of lot-
tery tickets in World 1 to that in World 2 is N1p1 : N2p2. All the
observations exist, but with different measures for their reality,
analogous to holding different numbers of lottery tickets. Choosing
a measure-weighted observation at random is analogous to choos-
ing a lottery ticket at random. The choice is not actually made
(since all observations really exist in the many-worlds version), but
for assigning probabilities to the observations despite the deter-
minism of the no-collapse version of quantum theory, it is helpful
to imagine such a random choice.
Let us now go to a more realistic, but still highly idealized,
Model II in which we consider the multiverse variation of one
single effective coupling ‘constant,’ the cosmological constant Λ.
Using here and henceforth Planck units (h¯ = c = G = 1), the ob-
served value of the cosmological constant in our World or part
of the multiverse is extremely tiny, ΛO ∼ 3.5 × 10−122, but string
landscape considerations [4–6] suggest that it could have a huge
number of different values in different parts of a multiverse. Pre-
sumably it could have a magnitude at least comparable to the
Planck value for either sign.
For simplicity, let us idealize the ‘discretuum’ of values sug-
gested by the string landscape to a continuum and hypothesize
a quantum measure that gives a normal distribution for the cos-
mological constant with standard deviation one Planck unit, so
p(Λ)dΛ = exp (−0.5Λ2)dΛ/√2π . The details of this are not im-
portant, but only the fact that the quantum measure is normal-
izable and is nearly ﬂat for values of Λ comparable to the tiny
observed value ΛO .
Now Martel, Shapiro, and Weinberg [12], following upon pre-
vious ideas of Weinberg [13–15], have shown that the “collapsed
fraction” of matter (here by gravitational collapse, not by the col-lapse of the wavefunction) to form potential observers is a very
sensitive function of Λ that decreases rapidly if Λ is much larger
than ΛO . Let us therefore consider an idealized model in which
the number of observations is proportional to exp [−(Λ/ΛO )2].
This is of course only a very crude hypothesis for what the ac-
tual dependence on the cosmological constant might be, but since
it is nearly ﬂat for very small values of Λ and falls off rapidly for
|Λ|  |ΛO |, as Martel, Shapiro, and Weinberg found for the col-
lapsed fraction, it will be suﬃcient for our purposes.
For an observation to occur at all, we need to restrict to worlds
in which there is at least one observation, so we need a numer-
ical coeﬃcient for the hypothesized gaussian dependence upon
the cosmological constant. If the universe had inﬁnite size (which
might be the most reasonable hypothesis), this coeﬃcient would
be inﬁnite, so that no matter how large Λ were and how small the
gaussian factor were, there would still be observations somewhere
in the inﬁnite universe. Therefore, in simple collapse versions of
quantum theory, there would be no restriction on the cosmological
constant, and its observed probability distribution would be given
purely by the quantum measure. If that were the normal distribu-
tion given above, the probability that the observed value would be
as small as ΛO would be very nearly 2ΛO /
√
2π ∼ 3 × 10−122.
This probability is so tiny that it is very strong statistical evi-
dence against the hypothesis that there is wavefunction collapse to
an eigenstate of the cosmological constant, with the probabilities
given by the absolute squares of the quantum amplitudes, from an
initial quantum state that is a nearly uniform superposition of in-
ﬁnite universes with the cosmological constant taking values over
a range comparable to the Planck value.
For a more conservative estimate of the probability of our ob-
servation of the tiny value of the cosmological constant, let us
suppose that the universe is ﬁnite. A plausible (though still very
highly uncertain) estimate of a ﬁnite size would be the size to
which the universe would inﬂate during slow-roll inﬂation from an
inﬂaton that starts near the Planck density. If the inﬂaton were a
massive scalar ﬁeld, observations of the ﬂuctuations of the cosmic
microwave background give m ∼ 1.5×10−6 [16,17]. Then if the in-
ﬂation starts with a symmetric bounce on a round three-sphere at
density ρ0 = 0.5m2φ20 , the volume at the end of classical slow-roll
inﬂation is approximately [18] [0.09644/(mρ20 )]exp(12πρ0/m2) ∼
exp(17× 1012ρ0), which would be ∼ exp (17× 1012) if the initial
density were the Planck density.
We have very little idea of the spatial density of observations
after inﬂation, but let us suppose that the absolute value of the
logarithm of that density is much less than 17 × 1012. For ex-
ample, if the density were one observation per Hubble volume
in our world today, or ∼ 10−184 in Planck units, the logarithm
would be ∼ −423.7, which is indeed negligible in comparison with
17 × 1012. So let us hypothesize that the number of observations
is, very crudely, exp [17× 1012 − (Λ/ΛO )2]. This is greater than
unity for |Λ/ΛO | < 4× 106, so this model would suggest that the
collapse of the wavefunction to any value of the cosmological con-
stant less than four million times the observed value would still
permit observations. Therefore, if the wavefunction for a universe
inﬂating from the Planck density did collapse to an eigenstate of
the cosmological constant with a probability given purely by a
quantum measure that is nearly uniform for values of Λ much less
than the Planck value, the probability plausibly would be less than
one in a million for observing our observed tiny value. Even this
estimate of the probability is conservatively high because of the
assumed very rapid drop-off in the number of observations with
|Λ|  |ΛO |, exponentially in (Λ/ΛO )2. Slower drop-offs would re-
duce the probability signiﬁcantly.
On the other hand, for a no-collapse or Everett version of quan-
tum theory in which the measure for observations is weighted not
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value of Λ but also by the number (or by the number density) of
observations, most of the total measure for observations would oc-
cur for Λ of the same order of magnitude as ΛO , thus explaining
the highly biophilic value observed for the cosmological constant
that would be an enormously improbable ﬂuke in a collapse ver-
sion of quantum theory with the multiverse initial quantum state
assumed here.
3. Alternative assumptions
The very strong statistical evidence deduced above against the
collapse of the wavefunction did include a number of crucial as-
sumptions. One of course is that the initial quantum state really
is a multiverse state, with a wide range of values of the effective
coupling ‘constants,’ and with most of the quantum measure for
values that are not nearly so biophilic as what we observe.
A second assumption is that the wavefunction collapses to an
eigenstate of the effective coupling ‘constants.’ If one has a very
large universe in which the wavefunction collapse leads to a spa-
tial distribution of different coupling ‘constants’ (though perhaps
deﬁnite in each region, so the collapse has eliminated the local
quantum uncertainty), then a random observation chosen from this
spatial distribution could still tend to favor biophilic values of the
local coupling ‘constants.’ One cannot really rule out a collapse ver-
sion of quantum theory without knowing what it says about how
the wavefunction collapses. However, it would seem simplest to
assume that the collapse would lead to an eigenstate of the effec-
tive coupling ‘constants,’ and it is that simple version that I have
shown leads to huge statistical problems for plausible multiverse
initial quantum states.
A third assumption is that the particular world or single history
resulting from the collapse of the wavefunction has a probability
given purely by the quantum measure (e.g., the absolute square
of the amplitude). If the collapse itself were caused by observation
(e.g., by conscious observers), then this might weight the results to
favor worlds with more observations. However, it would seem sim-
pler to assume that the collapse of the wavefunction, if it occurs
at all, occurs independently of observations.
4. Conclusions
I have shown that if the initial quantum state of the universe
is a multiverse state with most of the quantum measure spread
over values of the effective coupling ‘constants’ that are not partic-ularly biophilic, and if the wavefunction collapses to an eigenstate
of these ‘constants’ with a probability given purely by the absolute
square of the amplitude, then the probability is very small to ob-
serve the highly biophilic values that we in fact do observe. Thus
our observations of highly biophilic values is strong statistical evi-
dence against this simple form of wavefunction collapse under the
multiverse hypothesis.
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